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a b s t ract: The present argument focuses on part of Augustine’s defense of
Christianity in The City of God. There Augustine argues that the Christian religion did
not cause the sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 ce. Augustine revised the definitions
of a ‘people’ and ‘republic’ found in Cicero’s De Republica in light of the impossibility
of true justice in a world corrupted by sin. If one returns these definitions to their
original context, and accounts for Cicero’s own political teachings, one finds that
Augustine follows Cicero’s republicanism on several key points. First, civil rule differs
from mastery over slaves. Second, political life is indeterminate, so a republic could
be any regime suitable for governing free human beings. Third, the prudent man may
not abstain from public service. For Augustine the duty to public service is connected
to his tragic portrayal of life and suffering in society after ‘the fall’. Augustine’s
contribution to the republican tradition is not to be found in the concept of a natural
order, but in an explanation of why that order fails.
k e y words: Augustine, Cicero, justice, nature, republic, sin, skepticism

Operating on the assumption that Christianity is more compatible with monarchy
than republicanism, historians and political theorists often move from Aristotle
or Cicero to a discussion of Machiavelli in their narratives of the development
of republicanism.1 The tendency to contrast monarchy with republicanism is
m
 isleading because in the classical context the two concepts were understood
not to be mutually exclusive. In Cicero’s De Republica the term re publica is used
as a general term that refers to three pure ‘forms’ of governments (monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy) as well as to the mixed regime of the classical Roman
republic.2 Thus a republic could be a monarchy, an aristocracy, a democracy or
some combination of the three. The mixed constitution of republican Rome is
central to Cicero’s dialogue, while the only republic St Augustine would have
known was the later Roman Empire.3
In a recent work Antony Black has argued that the Christian ethos is as consistent with republicanism as it is with monarchy.4 Black disposed of the opposition
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between Christianity and republicanism in European political thought in his brief
but carefully constructed argument. Strangely the ancient writer who defended
Christianity most famously against the charge that it undermined the Roman
republic, St Augustine of Hippo, is passed over without mention, as are his famous
revisions of Cicero’s definitions of ‘people’ and ‘republic’.5 Black instead posits a
standard contemporary definition of ‘republic’ and shows how various Christian
writings and practices accord with it. Another weakness in Black’s approach is his
implicit acceptance of the theoretical opposition between republican government
and hereditary monarchy.
Cary Nederman suggests a corrective to Black’s approach, demonstrating that
there is a history of Christian republicanism that assumes a natural hierarchy
and is not hostile to monarchy or any other form of constitution.6 However
Nederman begins his account of Christian republicanism with a passage from
Gregory the Great. So despite their points of disagreement, one might say that
both authors argue that republicanism develops within Christianity in Europe
during the Middle Ages, and that both fail to mention Augustine in their accounts
of Christian republicanism.
The decision to avoid Augustine’s works in a short essay on republican thought
is understandable. Augustine was a bishop and theologian and none of his works
is exclusively devoted to civil government. One standard interpretation of his
political teaching holds that Augustine believed that the only function of political
rule is to remedy sin, and that human beings are not naturally political animals.7
In Augustine’s late antique world there could be no question of politics leading
human beings to happiness, since happiness was not to be found in this life.8
This interpretation of Augustine’s view of the status of politics has been challenged in a number of recent studies. Peter Burnell has argued that Augustine
did consider political rule to be rooted in nature.8 John von Heyking also has
defended the idea that Augustine’s works entail a ‘right-by-nature’ understanding of politics.10 Paul Weithman has shown that Augustine considered politics to
have a natural directive function distinct from that of domestic society.11 Besides
these works by political theorists, some philosophers and theologians working on
Augustine have come to reject what has come to be referred to as the ‘realist’ interpretation of Augustine’s attitude towards politics,12 which holds that Augustine
presents a portrait of human nature that is so irredeemably corrupted by sin that
the earthly city always requires power and subordination.13 These studies come at
a time when political events seem to have contributed to a more general interest
in Augustine than in recent decades.14
Here I construe Augustine’s attitude toward the Roman republic and civil government in general through statements in various books of The City of God. I
consider the extent to which Augustine’s teaching on political life incorporates
some views espoused by Cicero in his many works, but especially in De Republica. I
follow scholars who argue that Cicero’s works suggest that he viewed political life
as permanently problematic. Cicero’s political prudence recognized that there are
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less than reasonable tendencies in political life, and led him to shift his focus from
the issue of the best regime to that of the model statesman.15 Augustine’s view of
the indeterminacy of political life in book 19 of The City of God radicalizes Cicero’s
concern about the problematic nature of politics while maintaining Cicero’s distinction between civil government and slavery, statesmanship and domination.
Though Augustine shows little concern about the nature of a model statesman, he
makes it clear that he believed that the prudent man was driven by natural necessity to engage in public service, even though it would cause him to suffer.
Augustine’s adaptation of Cicero’s definitions of a ‘people’ and ‘republic’ help
clarify Augustine’s transformation of Cicero’s teachings. To show this I attend
to Cicero’s revaluation of rhetoric as an integral part of the active life of the
statesman and his explicit endorsement of the moderate skepticism of the New
Academy of Carneades.16 Cicero’s definitions treat the term ‘republic’ as a general
concept that can apply to any constitution. This activity of defining becomes central to Augustine’s argument against the infamous position that there are natural
slaves. In the end Augustine follows Cicero in opposing republican government
to conquest and mastery over slaves, and not opposing republican government to
monarchy. This can be seen in the metaphor of an order of rule and subjection
within human nature that corresponds to the order of human society and that is
employed by both authors.
We know the intentions of Augustine’s arguments from his own brief comments on the City of God in his work Retractations.17 Augustine intended to comfort
Christians who had suffered through the sack of Rome and to persuade the pagans
who argued that Christianity caused the sack. The present discussion ranges from
the first five books of the City of God, which are a response to the pagan view that
the fall of Rome was due to the failure to worship the Roman gods, to the final
section on the respective ends of the earthly and heavenly cities. This is appropriate to an interpretation of Augustine’s discussion of Cicero’s definitions, which
arise in book 2, where Augustine promises to return to them at a later point. That
return is found in book 19.

1
One obstacle to a clear understanding of Augustine’s revision of Cicero’s definitions of a ‘people’ and a ‘republic’ is the complexity of Cicero’s own position in
De Republica.18 That complexity is magnified by the fact that the dialogue comes
down to us in fragments. Cicero’s preface to book 1 set out an argument against
the Epicurean notion that the wise man pursues a private life of ease. He argues
that nature gives human beings a need for virtue and the protection of the common safety that overcomes their desire for the enjoyment of pleasure.19 Walter
Nicgorski and J. Jackson Barlow both offer evidence that this work entails a shift
in ancient political science away from a focus on the ‘best regime’ toward a focus
on the ‘ideal statesman’.20 The implications of such a shift have to be made clear
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before proceeding, and one implication has to do with a modification of the
Aristotelian approach to slavery.
Cicero’s main interlocutor, Scipio, gives his famous definitions in book 1 of the
dialogue. Scipio says that a republic (res publica) is the people’s property (re populi).
He then defines a ‘people’ (populus):
But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way,
but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to
justice and a partnership for the common good.21

136

The definitions are based on the idea that justice has a basis in nature, and that
no republic can be governed without justice. Scipio attributes this idea to Plato
and Aristotle.
In his subsequent discussion of the best regime, Scipio argues that Rome’s
republic is the best regime. Using Aristotle’s typology of regimes based on the
rule of one, the few, and the many, he is pressed into naming monarchy as the
best regime in theory. However, Scipio concludes that a moderate mixture of
monarchy, aristocracy, and popular rule would be best in practice. This is his
understanding of the Roman constitution.22 He then recounts innovations in
Roman politics over a number of centuries in order to show that a constitution
modified by many statesmen over generations is superior to the constitution of
a single lawgiver. Scipio is praised by Laelius for having invented a new style of
political dialogue. Unlike the Greek philosophers, Scipio argues that the best
regime is one founded over a long period of time by many wise statesmen.23
Rome’s laws and the men who governed Rome were not always just and virtuous, since innovations in the laws were needed to avert tyranny and quell disorders.
Another interlocutor, Lucius Furius Philus, makes this point. He urges Scipio to
reconsider the question since another common view is that no state (civitas) can
be ruled without injustice.24 Philus is chosen to present an argument in favor of
the view that bases the state on injustice. He agrees with the understanding that
the arguments he will present are not his but those of Carneades, a skeptic and
the leader of the New Academy, who once visited Rome on an embassy from
Athens (155 bce). Carneades made two public speeches on consecutive days, first
defending the idea of natural justice and then refuting it. According to Plutarch,
Carneades became very popular with the young men of Rome. Cato was offended
by Carneades’ attack on conventional Roman virtue and had him and the other
philosophers expelled from the city.25
The order of the speeches is reversed in Cicero’s work. First Philus makes the
case against natural justice, and against the idea that the state cannot be ruled
without justice. Justice is not natural because peoples have different and conflicting laws, and because states change their laws over time. Further, justice is
foolish and conflicts with prudence. Prudence teaches one to pursue his or her
own interest, whereas justice teaches one to pursue the interests of others. Utility
teaches statesmen to expand their state and its resources regardless of justice.26
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These arguments are supported with observations about Roman practices (Rome
built shrines for the men who expanded the state by conquest). Justice is at best
conventional and seems contrary to the interests of the republic.27 Philus asserts
that all who exercise the power over life and death are tyrants, though they prefer
to be called kings.28
Laelius responds to these points in the famous ‘vera lex’ passage.29 There is a
true law that embodies natural justice that is the same everywhere and is comprehensible through right reason. The fragments of Laelius’ speech are convoluted
but he appears to develop the passage on natural justice into a ‘just war’ defense of
Roman conquests. Then there is a paraphrase of Aristotle’s views on slavery.30
Do we not observe that dominion has been granted by nature to everything that is best, to
the great advantage of the weak? For why else does god rule over the man, the mind over
the body, and reason over the lust and anger and the other evil (vitiosis) elements of the
mind . . . But we must distinguish different kinds of subjection. For the mind rules over
the body, and also over the lust; but it rules over the body as a king governs his subjects,
or a father his children, whereas it rules over the lust as a master rules his slave, restraining
it and breaking its power. So kings, commanders, magistrates, senators, and popular
assemblies govern citizens as the mind governs the body; but the master’s restraint of his
slaves is like the restraint exercised by the best part of the mind (animus), the reason, over
its own evil and weak elements, such as lustful desires, anger, and the other disquieting
emotions.31

There are two key points to be drawn from this passage. One is that Laelius
describes two types of natural rule and subjection. One type is characterized by
reasoned command and obedience, while the other is characterized by coercion.
Notice that rule in a republic and paternal rule are placed into one category and
that slavery is placed into the other. Also notice that Laelius follows Scipio’s
earlier discussion by listing the ruling offices for each of the three pure forms of
constitutions in his analysis of the order of nature. In this sense the concept of a
divinely ordained natural order and hierarchy that Cary Nederman ascribes to the
Christian republicanism of the medieval period is present in classical thought.
The second point is that Laelius’ account of the order of nature is different
from Aristotle’s. Aristotle had characterized the rule of the mind over the body
as that of a master over a slave, and the rule of the intellect over the appetites as
political and monarchical. Scholars have taken two distinct approaches to this
issue. The first approach is to deny that this matters and assert that Laelius is
simply giving another version of the defense of slavery as natural.32 The other
approach understands Cicero to be substituting a justification for slavery based
on character defect for Aristotle’s justification based on nature.33 This second
approach seems more probable given the discussion of Rome’s history by Scipio
following Laelius’ speech.
Scipio returns to the discussion and draws the speakers’ attention back to his
definitions and the issue of natural justice. He reminds Laelius that all existing
republics, including Rome, had engaged in unjust wars or at times had fallen under
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control of unjust factions. Scipio adopts the view that the true republic exists only
in theory. In practice the term may be used to refer to imperfect regimes.34 A
republic then is the people’s estate, but no people remains permanently united in
the pursuit of justice. No state can exist without justice, but the conduct of public
affairs leads to injustice.35
Cicero’s discourse should be seen to have important consequences for the way
we understand Roman attitudes toward slavery. To begin with, Aristotle’s idea
of a type of slavery that does not arise from coercion is excluded. Slavery is by
definition coercion, and has its origins in conquest. But if slavery has its origins
in conquest, and if only some conquests are just, then many slaves suffer a penalty
that they do not deserve. The practical implications of this perspective for relations between masters and slaves are spelled out in some detail by Cicero in the De
Officiis.36 There in his account of justice Cicero discusses duties arising from the
virtue of justice connected to war. He expressly argues that masters have obligations of justice to their slaves, a view that directly contradicts Aristotle’s account
of mastery. This interpretation points to the doctrine of slavery as it developed in
classical Roman law, where slavery is held to be justified but contrary to nature.
The point is that slavery, like tyrannical rule, has its origins in coercion while
republican rule per se arises from natural necessity.
These passages reveal the way in which Cicero’s commitment to the philosophi
cal skepticism of the New Academy may reinforce the great value that Cicero
placed on statesmanship and rhetoric.37 Cicero’s use of the skeptical method arises
from his conviction that Carneades saved Socratic philosophy from the tendency
of the Stoics dogmatically to assert explanations that seemed disconnected from
the natural necessities of human life.38 As John von Heyking has noted, Augustine
adopted key aspects of Cicero’s defense of rhetoric in his treatise On Christian
Doctrine. Like Cicero, Augustine believed that rhetoric was a noble art that could
serve to instruct, delight, or move one’s listeners.39

2
Paying close attention to Augustine’s rhetoric, one quickly realizes that this
skeptical dimension of Cicero is pervasive in those passages of The City of God
that involve Augustine’s assessment of the status of political rule and the Roman
republic. Augustine recounts a famous anecdote about Alexander the Great and a
pirate in book 4 of the City of God. It is fair to assume that the immediate source of
the anecdote was the speech given by the character Philus in Cicero’s De Republica,
and that the story may have originated with Carneades himself.40 Alexander’s
soldiers captured a pirate. Alexander asked the pirate what he meant by keeping
hostile possession of the seas. The pirate replied:
What do you mean by seizing the whole earth, but because I do it in a small ship, I am
called a robber, while you who do it with a great fleet are styled ‘emperor’.41

138
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Does Augustine consider all political ruling to be tyrannical? Is political rule in
the same class of human relations as is mastery over slaves, or the rule of pirates
over their captives?
Book 4 had begun with a summary of Augustine’s arguments concerning the
history of the Roman constitution in response to the claim that the pagan religion
of Rome had been the cause of Roman greatness. Pleasing the gods ensured happiness in life and Christianity undermined civic virtue and led to decline. Augustine
uses the testimony of Roman authors against those who would condemn the
Christian religion (he uses material from Sallust and Cicero against Varro).42 It
turns out that the ‘good old days’ of the republic were not really that good. When
Rome was not embroiled in wars with other peoples, it was embroiled in civil wars
at home. The republic often punished some of its most virtuous citizens.43 Sallust
had shown that the Romans were ‘virtuous and moderate’ only when they were
compelled by a fear of Carthage.44 ‘But after the destruction of Carthage there
came the highest pitch of discord, greed, ambition, and all the evils which generally spring up in times of prosperity.’45
Augustine’s rhetoric may be seen as a reformulation Cicero’s discussion of the
problematic nature of Roman conquests and of politics in general from book 3 of
De Republica. To use von Heyking’s language, the Roman ordinate love of glory
was only constrained from becoming the degrading lust to dominate by the fear
of Carthage.
In the same passage Augustine asks, ‘Justice being taken away, what are
kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms?’ In doing so he draws us back into the classical debate over the relationship
between justice and political rule. Notice that this question reorients Augustine’s
rhetoric. Here he assumes the view that no republic deserving of the name is
entirely without justice, and this is an orientation that he never abandons. As
Burrell argues, Augustine’s decision to omit justice from his definition of a people
and a republic in no way precludes him from understanding justice to be necessary to the existence of a republic.46 On the other hand, Augustine asks whether
Roman wars of conquest were morally distinct from the actions of pirates and
brigands. Augustine’s rhetoric raises doubts about the meaning of ‘republic’, but
also maintains a distinction between the love of glory during Rome’s republican
history and the lust to dominate other peoples that arose later. One disposition is
consistent with civil ruling, the other with tyranny.
So, was the Roman republic a great robber band? Did Augustine associate Rome
with his understanding of the corrupt ‘earthly city’?47 When speaking specifically
of the wars that led to Rome’s expansion he is willing to accept that some of these
were justified.48 This merely shows that Rome benefited from the wickedness of
others, and that Rome’s love of glory was the source of its own corruption:
Let them ask, then, whether it is fitting for good men to rejoice in extended empire. For
the iniquity of those with whom just wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom,
which would certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any
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wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being thus happy,
all kingdoms would have been small, rejoicing in neighborly concord . . .49

If not for the wickedness of its neighbours, Rome would not have been able to
preserve its austere virtue as exemplified by four great Romans whom Augustine
upholds as model citizens: Regulus, Scaevola, Scipio and Fabricius.50

3

140

It should be clear that it is necessary to understand Augustine’s discussion of the
anecdote of Alexander and the pirate in the context of his analysis of Cicero’s
definitions. Augustine takes up Cicero’s definitions to demonstrate that Cicero
and other great Romans had identified the corruption and decline of the Roman
republic in times long before the birth of Jesus.51 Augustine promises to revisit the
issue of defining a republic later, and to show that even at the pinnacle of Roman
virtue, Rome did not conform to the definition. Without Christ there can be no
true justice, without justice there can be no ‘people’, and no ‘republic’. Augustine
takes up the problem where Scipio leaves it, and proceeds to give a Christian
explanation of the factors that prevent any temporal republic from conforming
to true justice. The groundwork for his explanation is found in his discussion
of creation, original sin and the order of nature,52 and in his defense of natural
liberty.53
In his discussion of the origins of the two cities Augustine gives his famous treatment of the philosophical problem of evil, and in doing so addresses the theme
of the order of rule and subjection in human nature. There he argues that human
goodness, and especially the good will of the first man, was dependent upon God’s
grace. When the human will defected from God it ceased to be good. At that point
the order of human nature was lost, and the subject elements of human nature
ceased to obey the ruling elements. The earthly city has its origin in sin.
On this account human beings are born into strife, since our flesh lusts against
our spirit.54 Later Augustine takes up the issue of the relationships among the
parts of the soul, particularly the reasoning part and the appetitive parts. There
he grants the philosophical views stated by Laelius that in this life the ‘law of
wisdom’ must restrain the anger and the lusts, but denies that this is due to human
nature. This disobedience is just punishment for the first man’s disobedience.
Before sin human appetites would have been ordered and would not have caused
suffering.55
The notion of the order of nature created by God reappears in book 19 as
Augustine begins his discussion of the ends of the two cities. That book opens
with a discussion of Marcus Varro’s account of the various views of happiness held
by the philosophical schools, and Varro’s defense of the view of the Old Academy
founded by Plato. On this view the summum bonum is a combination of the virtues
of the soul and primary natural goods of the body, both of which were understood
to be desired as good in themselves.56 Augustine then turns back to the biblical

Downloaded from ept.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on May 28, 2013

Cornish: Augustine’s Contribution to the Republican Tradition
account of human origins, and points out that Christians reject the philosophical
identification of the summum bonum with any kind of temporal good. He eventually works his discourse back to the philosophical school endorsed by Cicero, the
New Academy.
Augustine gives an account of the cardinal virtues in light of his doctrine of the
Fall. The order in which he takes up the virtues follows from his understanding
of fallen human nature. Virtue is not natural, but rather something brought in
by instruction to fight the perpetual war with vice. Temperance is necessary to
free the mind from the lust of the flesh that would lead to crimes of every sort.
Prudence is the vigilant discrimination between good and evil. The function of
Justice is to assign to each his due. Human beings were made according to the
image and likeness of God and were placed in what Augustine calls the ‘right
order of nature’ (justus ordo naturae). The body was subject to the soul, and the
soul was subject to God, and so the body and the soul were obedient to God.
When human beings chose to ignore God’s command and act according to their
own wills, this order and the integrity of human nature were lost. The result is the
privation of the right order of nature, original sin. This makes justice obscure to
human reason and an impossible standard for temporal society. Fortitude involves
suffering this disorder with patience.57
According to Augustine the Christian understands and accepts the tragic uncertainty of the present life, and is better able to bear suffering with fortitude than
pagan priests and philosophers. This suffering is discussed in chapters 5–10 of
book 19. Augustine argues that all human beings suffer in this life, not because
they are evil, but simply because of the ignorance and uncertainty to which one is
subject in human society. Augustine speaks of three circles of human society: the
household and family, the city, and the world. Even in the smallest circle based
on natural affection, one is not safe from pain and misunderstanding. One will
experience the death of loved ones, or even the betrayal of a malevolent child.58
To drive home the political implications of this uncertainty Augustine describes
the vocation of a judge. In Roman society the judge was required by law to torture
witnesses in order to obtain evidence. Worse still, the judge had to condemn men
to death knowing that some were bound to have been innocent. Unlike the Stoic
philosophers who had argued that the just judge could remain happy by becoming detached from this suffering, the Christian must acknowledge that even the
virtuous judge cannot be immune to the pain caused by one’s ignorance of the
complete truth. Worse still, it would be wrong for the judge to withdraw from
public life, since a duty is owed to society.59 It is not surprising that a study of
Augustine’s political activity reveals him frequently interceding for clemency on
behalf of criminals, even those condemned to death.60
In our present condition we frequently mistake friend for enemy, and enemy for
friend: And if we escape this pitiable blindness, is not unfeigned confidence and mutual
love of true and good friends, our true solace in human society, filled as it is with
misunderstandings and calamities?61 If such uncertainty exists among people who are part
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of the same civil society, and even the same household, what of the uncertainty experienced
by strangers? For if two men, each ignorant of the other’s language, meet, and are not
compelled to pass, but, on the contrary, to remain in company, dumb animals, though
of different species, would more easily hold intercourse than they, human beings though
they be. For their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are perverted by
diversity of language from conveying their sentiments to one another, so that a man would
more readily hold conversation with his own dog than with a foreigner.62

Note Augustine’s insight into the classical claim that human beings are naturally
political animals. Aristotle argued that the key attribute of human nature that
makes humans political animals is the ability to speak about the just, the good,
and the noble.63 Augustine explains that the inability of people to communicate
about these things is the central cause of war. The point is not to show that human
beings are not social and political animals, but to show that the corruption of
original sin has made true society impossible.
War is part of the human condition. Yet the act of war aims at the kind of good
people can attain in this earthly space, peace. It is the order of temporal peace that
can and must guide a judge and the statesman. Yet no virtuous judge or ruler can
preclude the suffering of innocent people.64
One may now summarize Augustine’s view of the Roman Republic. Augustine
agreed with Cicero that Rome’s love of glory was superior to the lust to dominate in the empire. The early republic, because it had been motivated by the
fear of Carthage, loved an ‘austere virtue’. Imperial expansion, at first motivated
by fear of other cities, eventually instilled into Romans the lust for domination.
Augustine illuminates the political importance of the seemingly apolitical morality
of the Gospels. Christianity teaches one to love God and to love one’s neighbours
as oneself. Augustine interpreted this to mean that one must harm no one and
that one must do what one can to help others. The commandment to love one’s
neighbour, then, is not entirely distinct from the order of justice, since it is itself
a command to do justice, but it also imposes duties that transcend those of justice.
Far from encouraging us to seclude ourselves into an Epicurean circle of friends,
Augustine places anyone exercising authority in the position of the just judge. It
may seem rather simple to avoid doing harm, but one surely will suffer if he acts
on the duty to help others, and the Christian may not put aside that duty.65
All human actions, good or evil, aim at some kind of peace. The highest good
for human nature is eternal peace, but human beings also seek temporal peace.66
Augustine gives an extended analysis of universal peace as concentric circles of
human society, each of which has its own order (i.e. ‘the arrangement of equals
and unequals which gives each its proper place’):

142

The peace of the body consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The
peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of its appetites, and the rational soul
the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and
harmonious life of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered
obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord.
Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those in the family who rule and
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those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the
celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and one another
in God. The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. Order is the distribution which
allots all things equal and unequal, each its own place.67

In this description of the order of peace Augustine does not mention directly an
order of rule and subjection between a master and a slave. That may be because
one part of the Greek and Roman practice of slavery was to include the slave as a
member of the complete household, and therefore part of domestic peace. Be that
as it may, the subsequent chapters of the book clarify the issue. There is a civil rule
that is not, like slavery, coercive.
Human beings are rational and pursue peace through an ordered agreement
of knowledge and action. In our sinful state we require divine instruction, which
teaches us to love God and to love our neighbour.68 These commandments
require that a person harm no one, and that he help everyone if possible. This
second requirement is most true in the order of domestic society. Domestic peace
requires that husbands must rule their wives, parents their children, and masters
their servants; and that the response to this guidance is due obedience. Yet this
in itself is not enough, since the just person must rule out of a dutiful concern for
others.69 The proper motivation of any ruler toward his subjects is determined by
the subjects’ nature. In the order of nature, man was made in a state of natural
liberty. Slavery came into being because of sin and was not part of God’s created
order. Commenting on Genesis 1: 26, Augustine defends the idea that people
were created in a state of natural liberty:
He did not intend that his rational creature, who was made in His image, should have
dominion over anything but irrational creation – not man over man, but man over beasts.70

Later Augustine reinforces this point, saying that God first created human nature
so that no one would be a slave to sin or to man. However, slavery was ordained by
the natural law that bids us to preserve the natural order by punishing those who
sin. Slaves taken in the conduct of war actually suffer the penalty of sin. Notice that
this view coincides with the understanding of slavery in classical Roman law.71
When Augustine returns to Cicero’s definitions, he deconstructs them in the
light of the Christian understanding of the disordered state of temporal life.72
Original sin makes true justice impossible. With no justice, then there can be no
sense of right and a people cannot be united in their common understanding of
right. Rome never could have been a people or a republic. Laelius’ attempt to
defend Roman conquests in terms of the right order of nature falls into the error
of defining natural justice as the advantage of the stronger over the weaker.73
Justice is properly defined as the virtue that assigns to each his due. It is unjust for
some people to serve others as masters and an ‘imperial city, embracing a mighty
state, cannot command provinces without pursuing injustice’. Augustine agrees
with Laelius that there is an order of nature but rejects its application in a justification of Roman conquest.74 He points out that this description is introduced in
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Cicero’s dialogue ‘as if’ it were drawn from nature. It displays Laelius’ confusion
of the disorder caused by sin with the natural order.
When human beings serve God, the soul does indeed command the body and
reason moderates the appetites. However, when a person does not serve God,
there can be neither a right order of the individual nature nor an order of justice in
society. Rome, even during the earliest days of the republic, failed to be truly just
because it did not teach its citizens to love the one true God. Rome’s civil religion,
far from contributing to Rome’s glory, actually sowed the seeds of Rome’s corruption. As Cicero admits, no temporal republic could fit Scipio’s definitions.75
Augustine’s treatment does not end with this deconstruction. He posits a definition of a people that is applicable to temporal republics. A republic is the people’s
property, and a people is ‘a large gathering of rational beings united in fellowship
by their agreement about the objects of their love’.76 Peoples may be judged based
on the objects loved. Augustine would consider the best temporal republic to be
one in which the government and the laws reflect the people’s love of God and
neighbour. This is the morality of the heavenly city, but it entails precisely the
perfect justice that is not possible for any temporal regime.77
Augustine argues that Christianity, because it teaches public morals more
effectively, is superior to Rome’s pagan religion. Like the regime of the ancient
Hebrews, which was provided with a simple but comprehensive system of laws
in the language of the people,78 Christianity encourages genuine virtue among
the citizens of any republic.79 Given this, it is quite impossible to conclude that
Augustine considered political rule to be simply a coercive remedy for sin. In
his discussion of universal peace he clearly sets political or civil rule apart from
domestic rule, suggesting that civil authority has a natural directive function in
society distinct from domestic life.80 He even argues that the household should be
organized to reflect the order of civil peace, since the end of the part is directed
to the end of the whole.81

4
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Contemporary theorists of civic republicanism locate the practical and theoretical
origin of republicanism in ancient Rome.82 Based on this narrative St Augustine’s
appraisal of the Roman republic must be seen as an important chapter in the histori
cal development of the republican tradition. We have argued that St Augustine’s
political teaching in The City of God may be seen to be consistent with Cicero’s
republican political thought on three key points. First, Augustine distinguished
between the rule that was consistent with slavery and political rule or, in other
words, between domination and liberty. Second, Augustine saw political rule as
being necessarily problematic and indeterminate. Though Augustine believed
that Christians could accept the doctrines of the faith with certainty, and that
dogmatically doubting the evidence of the senses was madness, he acknowledged
that one may entertain doubts about a range of issues that were not ascertained by
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the senses, taught by the scriptures, or witnessed by the Apostles.83 Clearly much
of what we seek to know about and to act upon in the world of civil governance
fits into these categories.
Finally, though the life of leisure in contemplation of the one true God may be
the most contented life, it cannot be chosen by a prudent person. Society is necessary for the continuation of life, and the virtuous person accepts his duty to serve
even as he recognizes the suffering service entails. The prudent ruler rules for the
common good, and not out of the lust to dominate. As a result the virtuous ruler
is always placed in the tragic situation of the just judge described by Augustine,
potentially punishing or even killing the innocent.
This emphasis on the tragic nature of political action is itself a major contribution to the history of republicanism. Nederman is quite right to stress the
importance of the idea of a natural order of rule and subjection in medieval republicanism, but a close study of Augustine’s City of God reveals the way in which this
organic metaphor is adapted from classical sources and transformed in Augustine’s
Christian account.84 When we look for Augustine’s contribution we find it not in
the concept of a natural order, but in an explanation of why that order fails.
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